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INTRODUCTION

This essay is based on my presentation at the 2020 International Law
Weekend, organized by the American Branch of the International Law
Association (ABILA). 1 As such, this essay is not intended to be an
exhaustive survey, but rather an overview of the main issues of interest. In
addition, this work specifically discusses potential upcoming progress
regarding international climate policies and potential setbacks.2 Therefore,


Carolina Arlota is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Oklahoma,
College of Law. Her contact address is: carolarlota@ou.edu. The author would like to thank Alexandra
Moore, Erica Jimenez, Jessica Velardi, Michaela Roselli, Michael Brito, Melissa Nunez, Samantha Harris,
and Magdalena Lewandowska for their outstanding work. The views presented here are those of the
author.
1.
This essay is based on the author’s presentation titled The Paris Agreement on Climate
Change in the Aftermath of the Pandemic: Challenges and Possibilities, which was presented on October
23, 2020 at the “COVID-19 and Climate Change: A Setback or Strengthening the Resolve to Move
Forward?” panel.
2.
Molly Bergen & Helen Mountford, 6 Signs of Progress Since the Adoption of the Paris
Agreement, WORLD RES. INST. (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/12/paris-agreementprogress-climate-action.
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this essay advances current knowledge on international energy law and
fosters its academic autonomy.
On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared
COVID-19 a pandemic.3 At the time, not much was known about the virus.4
Stringent measures imposing social distancing and closing all non-essential
businesses were implemented around the globe in a joint effort to contain the
virus, buying time for scientists, hospitals and medical workers to prepare.5
Against this background, an economic crisis started to develop based on a
drop in oil prices, due to the price war between Russia and Saudi Arabia.6
This economic crisis and the draining of financial resources made the
pandemic more severe. 7 At the same time, comparisons between the
pandemic and the climate crisis began to occur, with few paying attention to
the urgency and stringency of the measures to be taken.8 The pandemic and
climate crisis are also connected from a policy perspective because pollution,
such as greenhouse gases (GHGs), adversely impacts the immune and
respiratory systems, making individuals more vulnerable to the COVID-19
virus.9
3.
Tedros Adhanom, Director General, Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19 (Mar.
11, 2020).
4.
James Gallagher, Coronavirus: What we still don’t know about Covid-19, BBC (Mar. 29,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/health-52006988.
5.
See generally Policy Responses to COVID-19, IMF, https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imfand-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19 (last visited Jan. 14, 2021) (providing a compiled list of all
of the stringent policies that have been implemented in response to COVID-19, such as social distancing
and business closure).
6.
An unprecedented global health and economic crisis, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY,
https://www.iea.org/topics/covid-19 (last visited on Jan. 11, 2021) (contending that global oil and gas
markets were facing an unprecedented situation of collapsing demand with an already abundant supply
that continues to increase because of the pandemic as well); Clifford Krauss & Stanley Reed, Oil Prices
Dive as Saudi Arabia Takes Aim at Russian Production, N.Y. T IMES (Mar. 8, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/08/business/saudi-arabia-oil-prices.html.
7.
REBECCA ENGEBRESTEN, THE IMPACT OF CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19) AND THE GLOBAL
OIL PRICE SHOCK ON THE FISCAL POSITION OF OIL-EXPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, OECD (Sept.
30, 2020), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=136_136801-aw9nps8afk&title=The-impact-ofCoronavirus-COVID-19-and-the-global-oil-price-shock-on-the-fiscal-position-of-oil-exportingdeveloping-countries.
8.
Owen Jones, Why Don’t We Treat Climate Crisis with the Same Urgency as Coronavirus,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/05/governmentscoronavirus-urgent-climate-crisis. There were exceptions early on. While coronavirus is “understandably
treated as an imminent danger, the climate crisis is still presented as an abstraction whose consequences
are decades away. Unlike an illness, it is harder to visualize how climate breakdown will affect us each
as individuals,” and society as a whole. Id. at 2.
9.
JASON A. SCHWARTZ, INST. POL’Y INTEGRITY, WEAKING OUR DEFENSES: HOW THE
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S DEREGULATORY PUSH HAS EXACERBATED THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC, 4–6
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This essay focuses on the challenges that arose due to the pandemic and
how policy makers may take advantage of the economic and health crises to
rapidly advance a greener economy.10 Steering a transition from fossil fuels
to non-carbon-based sources should be an important consideration after the
COVID-19 pandemic, along with the pressing concerns of justice also
triggered by the pandemic.11 In this regard, this essay discusses the main
treaties on international energy law. 12 These treaties are aligned with
international commitments, most prominently the United Nations
Sustainable Development Goals (SDG).13 Sustainable Development Goal 13
promotes the need for immediate and effective climate action (SDG 13).14
This is relevant as the synergistic nature of climate threats has not been fully
assessed, and the outcomes are likely to be worse than the sum of the
independent parts.15
On its own, the COVID-19 pandemic is unlikely to meaningfully reduce
carbon emissions. 16 The International Energy Agency (IEA) warns that,
unless investments are made in “cleaner and more resilient energy
infrastructure[s]”, total emissions may rebound, as has happened after
previous economic crashes, to higher levels than before the crisis.17 Recent
(July
10,
2020),
https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Weakening_Our_Defenses_Covid_Deregulation_Report.pdf
; Ingmar Schumacher, Perspectives on the Economics of the Environment in the Shadow of Coronavirus,
76 ENV’T. RES. ECON. 465, 465 (2020); Jerry A. Nathanson, Air Pollution, Major Air Pollutants:
Greenhouse Gases, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/science/air-pollution (last updated
Oct. 19, 2020).
10.

OECD, MAKING THE GREEN RECOVERY WORK FOR JOBS, INCOME, AND GROWTH 2 (2020).

11.
KARL NIETVELT ET AL., S&P GLOBAL, THE ENERGY TRANSITION AND COVID-19: A
PIVOTAL MOMENT FOR CLIMATE POLICIES AND ENERGY COMPANIES (2020).
12.
Paris Agreement art. 1, Dec. 12, 2015, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev/ [hereinafter
Paris Agreement]; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
13.
Goal 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts, UNITED NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2021).
14.

Id.

15.
See O. Hoegh-Guldberg et al., The Human Imperative of Stabilizing Global Climate Change
at 1.5°C, 365 SCI. 1, 1 (2019), https://science.sciencemag.org/content/365/6459/eaaw6974.
16.
Piers M. Foster et al., Current and Future Global Climate Impacts Resulting from COVID19, 10 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 913, 913 (2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-020-0883-0
(emphasizing that, in the absence of long-term system-wide decarbonization of economies, major shifts
in behavior are insufficient to achieve anything but modest reductions); see also Carolina Arlota, The
United States Climate Change Policies and COVID-19: Poisoning the Cure, P ACE L. REV. (forthcoming
2021).
17.

GLOBAL ENERGY REVIEW 2020: THE IMPACTS OF THE COVID-19 CRISIS ON GLOBAL
AND
CO2
EMISSIONS,
INT’L
ENERGY
AGENCY
(2020),
https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-review-2020.

ENERGY

DEMAND
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empirical studies show that the immediate climate effects of pandemicrelated restrictions are close to negligible, and lasting effects, if any, will be
dependent upon the recovery strategy that is adopted in the medium-term.18
Furthermore, carbon dioxide emissions are expected to quickly rebound.19
According to a recent report by the United Nations Environment
Programme, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions will decrease in 2020. 20
Nonetheless, the “[r]esulting atmospheric concentrations of major GHGs
(CO2, methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O)) continued to increase in both
2019 and 2020.”21 To stabilize global warming, continuous reductions in
emissions are required to achieve net-zero CO2.22 Once such net-zero GHGs
emissions are achieved, the planet will first experience a peak and only later
will a decline in global warming occur.23
In such a scenario, the need for the reduction of both carbon emissions
and GHGs is extremely pressing.24 There is an international set of treaties
targeting such reductions.25 For example, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 26 and its corollary, the Paris
Agreement on Climate Change,27 have the reduction of carbon emissions and
GHGs as their main objectives.28 In 2015, the Twenty-First Conference of

18.
Corinne Le Quéré et al., Temporary Reduction in Daily CO2 Emissions during the COVID19
forced
Confinement,
10
NATURE
CLIMATE
CHANGE
647,
647
(2020),
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-020-0797-x.
19.
Id. at 650.
20.
U.N. Env’t Programme, Emissions Gap Report 2020: Exec. Summary, U.N. Doc.
DEW/2310/NA,
at
5
(2020),
https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/34438/EGR20ESE.pdf?sequence=8 [hereinafter
Emissions Gap Report 2020].
21.
Id.
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
Id. at 7.
25.
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2;
Dec. 10, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]; Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer art. 1, Sep. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
26.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, Sept. 5, 1992, S. TREATY
DOC NO. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter United Nations Framework]. The UNFCCC entered
into force on March 21, 1994. The scientific consensus regarding the existence of climate change was a
paramount consideration during UNFCCC negotiations. John Houghton, Science and International
Environmental Policy: The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in ENV’T. L., THE ECONOMY
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 355–57 (Richard Revesz et al. eds., 2001).
27.
See Paris Agreement, supra note 12, art. 2. The Paris Agreement, with its goal of reducing
GHGs, was negotiated following the legal framework of the UNFCCC, a treaty with 196 state parties to
which the Senate gave its advice and consent in 1992. Harold Hongju Koh, The Trump Administration
and International Law, 56 WASHBURN L. J. 413, 435 (2019).
28.

See Paris Agreement, supra note 12; see also United Nations Framework, supra note 26.
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the Parties of the UNFCCC enacted the Paris Agreement,29 an agreement that
specifically aims to contain the rising global average temperature to well
below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, while advancing efforts to cap the
temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.30
The main international obligations of the parties to the Paris Agreement
are their financial contributions to the Green Climate Fund 31 and the
fulfillment of each country’s “nationally determined contributions.”32 As the
language of the treaty conveys, both are voluntarily established commitments
determined by each country, exclusively.33 Under international law, the Paris
Agreement is unequivocally a treaty; as such, it requires signatories to
comply with its terms.34
II.

THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 FOR INTERNATIONAL ENERGY LAW AND
THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE

This part discusses the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic for
international energy law and, more specifically, for the Paris Agreement.
This part is based on the assumption that conflicts in international energy
law, including climate policy, do not primarily occur because of the absence
29.
See Paris Agreement, supra note 12. For an overview about the Paris Agreement, see, e.g.,
The
Paris
Agreement,
Summary,
CLIMATE
FOCUS
1,
1
(Dec.
28,
2015),
https://www.climatefocus.com/sites/default/files/20151228%20COP%2021%20briefing%20FIN.pdf;
see also Houghton, supra note 26, at 355–57.
30.

See Paris Agreement, supra note 12. Article 2 of the Paris Agreement states the following:
(1) This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, including
its objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change,
in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty,
including by: (a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well
below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature
increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would
significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change. Id. art. 2.

31.
Paris Agreement, supra note 12, art. 9 (“Developed country Parties shall provide financial
resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in
continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention. Other Parties are encouraged to provide
or continue to provide such support voluntarily.”). Id.; About GCF, GREEN CLIMATE FUND,
https://www.greenclimate.fund/about (last visited Jan. 28, 2021).
32.
Paris Agreement, supra note 12, art. 4, ¶ 2. (“Each Party shall prepare, communicate and
maintain successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve. Parties shall pursue
domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions.”). Id.
33.
According to articles 4 and 9 of the Paris Agreement. See Paris Agreement, supra note 12,
arts. 4, ¶ 2, 9, ¶ 1.
34.
According to international law, all written international agreements governed by
international law are referred to as “treaties.” Vienna Convention, supra note 12, art. 2., ¶ 1(a); see also
BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 932 (7th ed. 2018).
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of scientific facts or objective truth; instead, such disagreements are more
likely to be motivated by conflicting “priorities, interests, and normative
assumptions that create a number of subjective truths.” 35 This increases
transaction costs for parties to reach an international energy law agreement.36
Moreover, energy security planning is such a “complex and dynamic
[process] that it is [very] difficult to unify perspectives,” even in a single
country.37 Examples abound38—for instance, the so-called flip-flop of the
United States’ position on the Paris Agreement is a major illustration of
domestic tensions and politics being determinative of global outcomes.39
Accordingly, any international agreement on climate change has to
reconcile inherent tensions between domestic and international politics. 40
Those treaties also have to consider the different levels of countries’ growth
and industrialization on a global scale. 41 This part turns to two specific
international principles contained in the Paris Agreement that may contribute
to global action to combat the pandemic as well as to foster a greener
economy.42 These principles are sustainable development and common but
differentiated responsibilities. 43 This part concludes by examining the

35.
Benjamin K. Sovacool & Marilyn Brown, Deconstructing Facts and Frames in Energy
Research: Maxims for Evaluating Contentious Problems, 86 ENERGY POL’Y 36, 36−37 (2015).
36.
Id. at 38.
37.
See Benjamin K. Sovacool & Harry Saunders, Competing Policy Packages and the
Complexity of Energy Security, 67 ENERGY 641, 641 (2014), emphasizing that,
The result is that important interdependencies and interconnections are sometimes
missed, laying a faulty foundation that can give rise to more intractable energy
problems down the road. The policymaker in India who seeks to improve access to
electricity to mitigate the health damage caused by indoor combustion of firewood
for cooking becomes an advocate of coal-fired power plants. A local problem is
solved and a national dilemma is born.
38.
Sovacool & Brown, supra note 35, at 38; Mark Cooper, Governing the global climate
commons: The political economy of state and local action, after the U.S. flip-flop on the Paris Agreement,
118 ENERGY POL’Y 440, 440 (2018).
39.

Cooper, supra note 38, at 440.

40.

See generally Sovacool & Saunders, supra note 37, at 641.

41.

Id.

42.
Paris Agreement, supra note 12, at 1; Climate & SDGS Synergy Conference, U.N. DEP’T OF
ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, https://sdgs.un.org/events/climate-and-sdgs-synergy-conference-7569 (last
visited Jan. 15, 2021); Climate Action, U.N., https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/climate-action/
(last visited Jan. 15, 2021).
43.

Paris Agreement, supra note 12, at 1.
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specific impact of the pandemic on international negotiations at the future
Conference of the Parties (COP).44
A.

Sustainable Development

Sustainable development, with preliminary notions that date back to
1945, was conceptualized with more precision at the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, in 1972.45 However, this concept
was not used until the 1980s, when the Brundtland Commission Report
defined it as “development . . . that . . . meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”46
Later on, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development framed it in
a quite anthropocentric fashion, stating in Principle 1 that “[h]uman beings
are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled
to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.” 47 World
governments adopted sustainable development as the development paradigm
in 1992, at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.48
As the concept of sustainable development has been significantly
debated—with many questioning its legal force and whether it has some other
normative value, even one of a non-legal or quasi-legal character 49 —the
dimensions considered in the Paris Agreement are open to debate.50 There
44.
The Ambition, CLIMATE AMBITION SUMMIT 2020, https://www.climateambition
summit2020.org/index.php#programme (last visited Jan. 15, 2021) [hereinafter The Ambition]; Climate
Ambition Summit 2020, IISD (Dec. 12, 2020), https://sdg.iisd.org/events/5th-anniversary-of-the-parisagreement/#:~:text=The%20Climate%20Ambition%20Summit%202020,Agreement%20and%20the%2
0multilateral%20process.
45.
U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/Rev.1, at 3 (June 5,
1972); Promote Sustainable Development, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/sections/what-wedo/promote-sustainable-development/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2020); see also Bimal N. Patel & Ranita Nagar,
Introduction, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INDIA: CONVERGENCE OF LAW, ECONOMICS,
SCIENCE, AND POLITICS 1−10 (Bimal N. Patel & Ranita Nagar eds., 2018).
46.
U.N. Secretary-General, Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on
Environment and Development, From One Earth to Another, pt. 1, § 3, ¶ 27, § 4, ¶ 81, U.N. Doc A/42/427
(Aug. 4, 1987); see also EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 26,
184 (2016); Patel & Nagar, supra note 45, at 1.
47.
Stephen Hammer & Stéphane Hallegatte, Planning for the economic recovery from COVID19: A sustainability checklist for policymakers, WORLD BANK BLOGS (Apr. 14, 2020),
https://blogs.worldbank.org/climatechange/planning-economic-recovery-covid-19-coronavirussustainability-checklist-policymakers.
48.
Id.
49.
Riccardo Pavoni & Dario Piselli, The Sustainable Development Goals and International
Environmental Law: Normative Value and Challenges for Implementation, 13 VEREDAS DO DIREITO,
BELO HORIZANTE 13, 15 (2016).
50.
Id.; see generally Paris Agreement, supra note 12.
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is, however, some consensus in interpreting sustainable development in that
it requires analysis of the interplay between economic growth, social
development, and environmental protection. 51 In the aftermath of the
pandemic, the emphasis on social development—including access to medical
care, clean energy, education, and a healthy environment—will become
crucial.52
B.

Common but Differentiated Responsibilities

The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities (CBDRRC), referring specifically to different
responsibilities allocated among countries,53 has been controversial since its
inception in the UNFCCC.54 The principle appears, more recently, in the
Paris Agreement. 55 According to this principle, responsibility for both
current and historical emissions need to be considered.56 The evidence is
unambiguous: from 1850 to 2011, the developed world contributed 79% of
GHG emissions.57
As developing states have had a far lower impact on the current
concentration of GHGs and the overall threshold on carbon saturation, 58
developed countries must provide climate financing to less developed
51.
Social
Development
for
Sustainable
Development,
UNITED
NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/2030agenda-sdgs.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2021).
52.
Hammer & Hallegatte, supra note 47.
53.
United Nations Framework, supra note 26, art. 3, ¶ 1. (“The Parties should protect the
climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and
in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”). Id.
54.
David Freestone, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change—The
Basis for the Climate Change Regime, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE
CHANGE LAW 99, 103 (Cinnamon P. Carlarne et al. eds., 2016) (explaining the differentiated treatment
established under articles 4 and 12 of the UNFCCC, as Annex I parties encompass “all the developed
states and states with economies in transition . . . [namely] . . . the members of the former Soviet Union[,]”
while Annex II includes all the developed states which are expected to financially contribute. Developing
countries are defined as non-Annex I in the Convention). Id.; see also United Nations Framework, supra
note 26.
55.
Paris Agreement, supra note 12, art. 2, ¶ 2. (“This Agreement will be implemented to reflect
equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the
light of different national circumstances.”). Id. arts. 2, 9.
56.
Daniel Bodansky et al., International Environmental Law: Mapping the Field, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1, 11 (2008).
57.
Jonah Busch, Climate Change and Development in Three Charts, CTR. FOR GLOB. DEV.
(Aug. 18, 2015), https://www.cgdev.org/blog/climate-change-and-development-three-charts.
58.
Ting Wei et al., Developed and Developing World Contributions to Climate System Change
Based on Carbon Dioxide, Methane and Nitrous Oxide Emissions, 33 ADVANCES IN ATMOSPHERIC SCI.
632, 632 (2016); Bodansky et al., supra note 56, at 11 (noting article 3 of the UNFCCC refers to
“respective capabilities,” which means that capacity to pay is relevant along historical responsibility). Id.
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countries, as determined by international treaties. 59 Importantly, energy
justice also fosters institutional action, which may minimize the impact of
the so-called “curse” of natural resources for developing countries. 60
Institutional action, under the terms of the UNFCCC and the Paris
Agreement, requires developed countries to take the lead in reducing
emissions.61 The necessity of this leadership has been proven even more
relevant in light of the pandemic and the economic crisis that has ensued.62
Likewise, the need to transfer funding and technology increased during the
pandemic. 63 This exacerbates the international obligation of developed
countries to not only invest in their own greener recovery, but also to steer
efforts for such greener scenarios in developing nations.64 This is why the
legal framework of the Paris Agreement calls for financial contributions to
the Green Climate Fund, which was established by the Conference of the
Parties in 2010 (under the UNFCCC, and as part of the Convention’s
financial mechanism).65 More specifically, the Green Climate Fund aims to
advance adaptation to the impact of climate change and reduce GHG
emissions in the developing world.66 Importantly, recent research contends
that overreliance on technological innovation has jeopardized a significant
reduction of GHG emissions at the expense of countries located in the Global
South, as well as those more vulnerable populations in the future, globally.67
Accordingly, more actions from developed countries are needed quickly.
59.
Paris Agreement, supra note 12, art. 9; see also United Nations Framework, supra note 26,
art. 3, ¶ 1.
60.
Paris Agreement, supra note 12, art. 11; Stewart M. Patrick, Why Natural Resources Are a
Curse on Developing Countries and How to Fix It, ATLANTIC (Apr. 30, 2012)
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/why-natural-resources-are-a-curse-ondeveloping-countries-and-how-to-fix-it/256508/.
61.
See, e.g., United Nations Framework, supra note 26, arts. 3–4; Paris Agreement, supra note
12, art. 4.
62.
U.N. GAOR, 31st Spec. Sess., 2nd Plen Mtg. U.N. Doc GA/12293 (Dec. 3, 2020).
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
The Green Climate Fund technically aims to finance equal amounts to mitigation as well as
to adaptation initiatives under the UNFCCC. Its first mobilization dates back to 2014, and since the Paris
Agreement (2015), the Fund has played an important role in advancing the objectives established in the
Paris
Agreement
on
Climate
Change.
Overview,
GREEN
CLIMATE
FUND,
https://www.greenclimate.fund/about (last visited Jan. 20, 2021); Paris Agreement, supra note 12, art. 9.
66.
The Green Climate Fund focuses on the needs of those who are “highly vulnerable to the
effects of climate change,” specifically in Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Small Island Developing
States (SIDs), and African States. Overview, supra note 65.
67.
Lancaster University, Why relying on new technology won’t save the planet, SCI. DAILY
(APR. 20, 2020), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2020/04/200420125510.htm.
Each novel promise not only competes with existing ideas, but also downplays any
sense of urgency, enabling the repeated deferral of political deadlines for climate
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The Climate Ambition Summit: 2020

The United Nations, France, and the United Kingdom, in partnership
with Chile and Italy, jointly hosted the Climate Ambition Summit on
December 12, 2020.68 This virtual meeting gathered representatives of most
Member States, indigenous peoples, civil society, non-governmental
organizations, and other key actors in preparation for the next Conference of
the Parties—COP 26, which was postponed to November 2021, due to the
pandemic.69 The goal was to discuss the implementation of “new and [more]
ambitious commitments under the three pillars of the Paris Agreement:
mitigation, adaptation and finance commitments.”70
On the eve of the Climate Ambition Summit, the European Union
reiterated its earlier commitment to reduce its GHG emissions by at least
55%, having the net carbon emissions measured in 1990 as its baseline.71
The increasing number of countries committing to net-zero emissions goals
by 2050 is “the most significant and encouraging development in terms of
climate policy in 2020.”72 Top polluters, such as the European Union, Japan,
and China (committing to achieve net-neutrality by 2050 and 2060,
respectively) have already explicitly embraced such goals, whereas in the
United States, the Biden-Harris administration has already signaled its
intention to follow suit.73 Therefore, the pandemic has contributed to overall
cooperation among different countries and an overall willingness for
developed world nations to engage in more ambitious climate goals.74 For
developing nations, it is too early to make a judgment call.

action and undermining societal commitment to meaningful responses . . . but such
promises can feed systemic 'moral corruption', in which current elites are enabled
to pursue self-serving pathways, while passing off risk onto vulnerable people in
the future and in the global South. Id.
68.
The Ambition, supra note 44.
69.
Id.; Press Release, United Nations Climate Change, COP-26 Postponed, UN Climate Press
Release (Apr. 1, 2020); Press Release, U.K. Gov., New Dates Agreed for COP26 United Nations Climate
Change Conference (May 28, 2020).
70.
The Ambition, supra note 44.
71.
Monika Pronczuk, E.U. Agrees to Slash Carbon Emissions by 2030, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/11/world/europe/eu-climate-emissions.html (discussing the
new pledges of the European Union, who increased its original commitment in reducing net carbon
emissions in at least 55% from its levels measured in 1990). The article also informs that this stringent
target positions the European Union in the forefront of global climate fighting and strategically sets the
bloc on its path to carbon neutrality by 2050. Id.; Live: Climate Ambition Summit, U.N. NEWS (Dec. 12,
2020), https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/12/1079862.
72.
Emissions Gap Report 2020, supra note 20, at 7.
73.
Id. at 7.
74.
Id. at 4–5.
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III. THE MAIN CHALLENGES REGARDING INTERNATIONAL ENERGY LAW
AND THE FULFILLMENT OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT’S GOALS
This part focuses on the main challenges that policy makers will face in
the field of international energy law as they aim to fulfill the goals of the
Paris Agreement, namely, to limit the global increase in mean temperature to
well below 2°C (35.6°F) compared to pre-industrial levels.75
First, the pandemic is likely to increase emissions of GHGs, unless
countries actively engage in investing in a greener economy.76 The decline
in green energy investments provoked by the pandemic may also contribute
to a spike in carbon emissions. 77 The flexibilization of the enforcement
concerning environmental regulations may also contribute to increased
emissions.78 Pandemic-related cleaning and disinfecting activities are also
expected to have a negative environmental impact.79
Second, the Biden-Harris administration is committed to fostering
energy transition from fossil fuels to a greener economy but faces significant
challenges with current policies. 80
Specifically, the Biden-Harris
administration will have to undo numerous anti-climate policies
implemented by the Trump administration.81 Key among them is the United
States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, which occurred on November
4, 2020.82 The Paris Agreement is considered a historic breakthrough, as it

75.
Paris Agreement, supra note 12, art. 2.
76.
Emissions Gap Report 2020, supra note 20, at 6 (discussing the need for more stringent
NDCs as well as specific policies to reduce GHGs emissions such as investments on research and the
support for zero emissions). Id.
77.
Kenneth T. Gillingham et al., The Short-run and Long-run effects of COVID-19 on Energy
and the Environment, 4 JOULE 1337, 1338–1341 (2020).
78.
Emissions Gap Report 2020, supra note 20, at 13; U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Memorandum
on COVID-19 Implications for EPA's Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Program (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-03/documents/oecamemooncovid19implications.pdf.
79.
Mandred Lenzen et al., Global Socio-Economic Losses and Environmental Gains from the
Coronavirus
Pandemic,
15
PLOS
ONE
(July
9,
2020),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0235654.
80.
The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice, BIDENHARRIS,
https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2021); Tyler Clevenger & Dan Lashof, 7 Ways
the Biden Administration Can Reverse Climate Rollbacks, WORLD RES. INST. (Jan. 19, 2021),
https://www.wri.org/blog/2021/01/7-ways-biden-administration-can-reverse-climate-rollbacks.
81.
Clevenger & Lashof, supra note 80.
82.
Art. 28 of the Paris Agreement, which determines the withdrawal procedure, does not
authorize notice of withdrawal within the first three years that the Agreement has entered into force. Paris
Agreement, supra note 12, art. 28. The United States served notice of the withdrawal on the first date
possible under the Paris Agreement. Lisa Friedman, Trump Serves Notice to Quit Paris Climate
Agreement,
N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/climate/trump-paris-agreementclimate.html (last updated Jan. 20, 2021).
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marked the end of a decade long stalemate over the full integration of the
United States and developing economies into the climate regime.83
In such a context, the Biden-Harris administration deserves praise for
advocating that the United States rejoin the Paris Agreement on its first day
in office.84 The Biden-Harris administration will have to address the ongoing
economic, environmental, and health crises that were aggravated by the
COVID-19 pandemic and the policy choices made by the Trump
administration. 85 The attacks by President Trump on science, which are
routinely referred to as a “war on science,” have undermined significant
environmental protections and ultimately jeopardized the health and quality
of life of the United States population. 86 Importantly, those with less
financial resources have suffered the most.87
Third, there is significant uncertainty concerning the level of United
States engagement and leadership on urgent climate matters. 88 Despite
reiterated commitments of the Biden-Harris administration, including the
previously referenced rejoining of the United States to the Paris Agreement
and the appointment of John Kerry as a special envoy for climate,89 how
effectively the new administration implements its climate goals remains to
be seen. 90 Moreover, the world’s response to the United States as it is
83.
Meinhard Doelle, Assessment of Strengths and Weaknesses, in THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON
CLIMATE CHANGE: ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 387, 400 (Daniel Klein et al. eds., 2017).
84.
The President-elect tweeted that his administration will rejoin the Paris Agreement. See Joe
Biden vows to rejoin the Paris climate deal on first day of office if elected, CARBON BRIEF (Nov. 11,
2020), https://www.carbonbrief.org/daily-brief/joe-biden-vows-to-rejoin-the-paris-climate-deal-on-firstday-of-office-if-elected [hereinafter Rejoin Paris climate deal].
85.
Impact of COVID-19 on people’s livelihoods, their health and our food systems, WHO (Oct.
13, 2020), https://www.who.int/news/item/13-10-2020-impact-of-covid-19-on-people's-livelihoodstheir-health-and-our-food-systems; Clevenger & Lashof, supra note 80.
86.
Carolina Arlota, How President Trump’s War on Science Undermines Cost-Benefit Analysis
of Climate Policies, 50 ENV’T L. REP. 10999, 11007−14 (2020).
87.
Id.; Carmin Chappel, Climate change in the US will hurt poor people the most, according
to a bombshell federal report, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/26/climate-change-will-hurt-poorpeople-the-most-federal-report.html (last updated Nov. 26, 2018).
88.
Carolyn Beeler, Top US leadership is ‘missing ingredient’ in climate change action, WORLD
(Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-09-18/top-us-leadership-missing-ingredient-climatechange-action.
89.
Rejoin Paris climate deal, supra note 84; Lisa Friedman, With John Kerry Pick, Biden
selects a ‘Climate Envoy’ With Stature, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/23/climate/johnkerry-climate-change.html (last updated Dec. 11, 2020) (emphasizing that the special climate envoy is a
new cabinet-level position to be created under President-elect Biden’s presidency).
90.
See generally Thomas Hale and Nathan Hultman, ‘All in’ Climate Diplomacy: How a
Biden-Harris Administration can Leverage City, State, Business, and Community Climate Action,
BROOKINGS (Nov. 20, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/all-in-climate-diplomacy-how-abiden-harris-administration-can-leverage-city-state-business-and-community-climate-action/ (discussing
the administration’s various implementation strategies and what will be needed in order to successfully
implement those strategies).
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reclaiming its leadership on climate policies is unclear.91 After all, United
States leadership in international matters has been jeopardized under
President Trump due to his unpredictability and his agenda to undo all
significant agreements made by his predecessor, President Obama.92 In the
field of international energy law alone (and in addition to the country’s
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement), the United States denunciation of the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (or the “Iran deal”),93 the Trans-Pacific
Partnership,94 and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty95 all serve
as evidence of how the Trump administration decided in a rush and with little
consideration for the international community as a whole.
Fourth, many countries have relinquished the opportunity brought by
the pandemic to build a more environmentally conscious economy.96 An
91.
Lara Lázaro-Touza, Biden-Harris Administration and Climate Change: Good News,
Caveats and Warnings, ELCANO ROYAL INST. (last updated Jan. 22, 2021),
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/el
cano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari9-2021-lazaro-biden-harris-administration-and-climate+change-good+newscaveats-and-warnings.
92.
Press Release, Emmanuel Macron, Angela Merkel, and Paolo Gentiloni, Paris Agreement
Cannot be Renegotiated (June 1, 2017) (on file with Ministère de L’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères).
In a joint statement, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and then
Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni were vocal in stating that President Trump’s decision was against
ongoing progress and that the Agreement was solid and not open to renegotiation. Such leaders jointly
declared: “We deem the momentum generated in Paris in December 2015 irreversible and we firmly
believe that the Paris Agreement cannot be renegotiated, since it is a vital instrument for our planet,
societies and economies.” Id.; see Juliet Eilperin & Darla Cameron, How Trump is Rolling Back Obama’s
Legacy,
WASH.
POST
(last
updated
Jan.
20,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-rolling-back-obama-rules/; see also Carolina
Arlota, Does the United States’ Withdrawal From the Paris Agreement Pass the Cost-Benefit Analysis
Test?, 41 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 881, 881 (2020) (criticizing the United States’ climate policies under the
Trump administration and its reduced leadership after its decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement
while continuing in the UNFCCC).
93.
See Remarks on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to Prevent Iran From Obtaining a
Nuclear Weapon and an Exchange with Reporters, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2, (May 8, 2018).
94.
Memorandum of Withdrawal of the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations
and Agreement, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Jan. 23, 2017).
95.
The Trump administration withdrew from this agreement with Russia, despite its previous
praise for the treaty, which was signed by President Reagan. See C. Todd Lopez, U.S. Withdraws From
Intermediate–Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, U.S. DEPT. DEF. (Aug. 2, 2019),
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1924779/us-withdraws-from-intermediaterange-nuclear-forces-treaty/. For a limited justification of the withdrawal, see Remarks in an Exchange
with Reporters in Elko, Nevada, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 3–4 (Oct. 20, 2018); see also Daryl
Kimball & Kingston Reif, The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL
ASS’N., https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty (last reviewed Aug. 2019).
96.
See OECD, GREEN BUDGETING AND TAX POLICY TOOLS TO SUPPORT A GREEN RECOVERY
1, 2–3 (2020), http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/green-budgeting-and-tax-policy-toolsto-support-a-green-recovery-bd02ea23/ (discussing what countries plan to do but have yet to do, in order
to build a more environmentally conscious economy).
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example of such an economy would be one based on the social cost of
carbon. 97
Recent research by Princeton University advised the
implementation of carbon pricing (whether as taxes or emissions trading)
aimed at reducing the adverse impacts of climate change as economies “build
back better.” 98 According to this research, the pandemic could be an
opportunity to improve sustainability and maximize well-being around the
globe as countries recover.99 Therefore, international energy law policies
aiming to implement the goals established by the Paris Agreement should be
based on mitigation, as the World Bank has defined mitigation action as “the
best insurance against an uncertain future.”100 Mitigation, therefore, is the
only way to effectively reduce carbon emissions.101
In such a context, leading emitters of GHGs, such as China, the United
States, Japan, and India face difficult policy choices, as their emissions are
based on large scale utilization of fossil fuels to produce energy for industry
and transportation sectors. 102 These countries’ emissions are considered
more difficult to abate, as significant investments and technological
innovation are required to achieve meaningful reductions. 103 Mitigation
technologies, such as carbon capture and storage (CCS), are a feasible
alternative for the reduction in the emission of CO2, particularly in the energy
sector. 104 Nonetheless, cost remains a significant challenge for CCS
implementation.105
97.
98.

See id. at 10–12.
Kian Mintz-Woo et al., Carbon Pricing and COVID-19, CLIMATE POL’Y. 1, 2 (Nov. 15,

2020),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14693062.2020.1831432?scroll=top&needAccess=true.
99.
Id. at 7.
100. WORLD BANK, TURN DOWN THE HEAT: WHY A 4°C WARMER WORLD MUST BE AVOIDED
1,
2
(2012),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/865571468149107611/pdf/NonAsciiFileName0.pdf.
101. See id. at 25.
102. Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/each-countrys-share-co2-emissions (last updated Aug. 12, 2020);
Melissa Denchak, Fossil Fuels: The Dirty Facts, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Jun. 8, 2018),
https://www.nrdc.org/stories/fossil-fuels-dirty-facts. The concept of “hard to abate emissions” is defined
by the Energy Transition Commission (ETC). See Mission Possible: Reaching Net-Zero Carbon
Emissions from Harder-to-Abate Sectors by Mid-Century, ENERGY TRANSITIONS COMM’N (Nov. 2018),
http://www.energy-transitions.org/sites/default/files/ETC_MissionPossible_FullReport.pdf [hereinafter
Reaching Net-Zero Carbon Emissions]. Such “harder-to-abate” emissions comprise those of sectors in
heavy industry (in particular cement, steel and chemicals) and heavy-duty transport (heavy-duty road
transport, shipping and aviation). Id. at 11. These sectors currently account for 10Gt (30%) of total global
CO2 emissions. Id. at 11.
103. Reaching Net-Zero Carbon Emissions, supra note 102, at 75.
104. The Global Status of CCS: 2017, GLOBAL CCS INST. 43 (2017),
https://www.globalccsinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/2017-Global-Status-Report.pdf.
105. See id. at 19.
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Accordingly, investments in mitigation efforts need to include a diverse
portfolio of financing sources, including a combination of public funds,
carbon market finance, and concessional financing.106 Moreover, financing
a greener economy is likely to be a challenge on its own, due to the resources
spent during the pandemic as well as the need for economic relief to those
who lost their jobs.107 A recent study by the Guardian revealed that countries
are pouring money into the fossil fuel economy to reduce the economic
impact of the pandemic, including its severe recession. 108 Therefore, the
pandemic increased the competition for funding.109
Such competition is also likely to have an adverse impact on
renewables. 110 On the one hand, as countries commit to more stringent
targets under the Paris Agreement, renewable resources are expected to rise
again.111 This is relevant as renewables require investment on research and
dissemination as well as implementation. 112 On the other hand, major
obstacles regarding renewable energy sources remain, such as affordability
and the need for grid updates.113
Fluctuation of energy supply prices also increased the competition for
credit. 114 Oil hit record low prices in March 2020, stranding financial

106. Sujata Gupta et. al., Cross-cutting Investment and Finance Issues, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTER-GOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1207, 1227 (2014),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ipcc_wg3_ar5_chapter16.pdf.
107. See Fiona Harvey, Revealed: Covid recovery plans threaten global climate hopes,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/nov/09/revealed-covidrecovery-plans-threaten-global-climate-hopes.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. Kieran Mulvaney, Climate change report card: These countries are reaching targets,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC,
https://www.nationalgeographic.co.uk/environment-andconservation/2019/09/climate-change-report-card-these-countries-are-reaching (last updated Nov. 5,
2020); Global Energy Review 2020, The Impacts of the COVID-19 Crisis on Global Energy Demand and
CO2 Emissions, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (Apr. 2020), https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-review2020/renewables.
112. Kesavan Sprinivasan & Srinivas Guarazada, Investing in a more suitable world during
COVID-19
recovery,
WORLD
BANK
BLOGS
(June
24,
2020),
https://blogs.worldbank.org/governance/investing-more-sustainable-world-during-covid-19-recovery;
U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, RENEWABLE ENERGY INTEGRATION (2021).
113. Easy to Say, Difficult to Achieve: Experts Discuss Forging a Fair, Green Economy, IISD
(Aug. 22, 2019), https://sdg.iisd.org/news/easy-to-say-difficult-to-achieve-experts-discuss-forging-a-fairgreen-economy/; Aaron Larson, Electric Transmission Grid Problems and Solutions, POWER (Aug. 3,
2020), https://www.powermag.com/electric-transmission-grid-problems-and-solutions/.
114. See ICIS Editorial, Coronavirus Impact on Energy Markets, INDEP. COMMODITY
INTELLIGENCE SERV., https://www.icis.com/explore/resources/news/2020/03/19/10482507/topic-pagecoronavirus-impact-on-energy-markets (last updated Nov. 13, 2020).
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resources. 115 With such diversified demand, funding to investments is
changing116 while the need for significant greener investments is increasing
under international treaties, as previously discussed.117 Furthermore, there
are increasing concerns regarding environmental protection and climate
change, both internationally118 and in the United States.119 This may lead to
progress. However, as of today, all of the challenges discussed are
relevant. 120 The manner in which countries decide to address these
challenges will be determinative of the future of the Paris Agreement and the
fulfillment of its goals. 121 The task is tremendously difficult, and the
pandemic may have aggravated it.122 There are no definitive answers for
now, as matters are still in flux.

115.

An Unprecedented Global Health and Economic Crisis, supra note 6; KEVIN L. CAMP ET

AL., U.S. BUREAU STAT., FROM THE BARREL TO THE PUMP : THE IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON
PRICES FOR PETROLEUM PRODUCTS (2020), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2020/article/from-the-barrelto-the-pump.htm.
116. This issue is of increased importance, as the European Investment Bank announced that it
will stop funding fossil fuels projects after 2021. Emanuela Barbiroglio, European Investment Bank will
Stop
Financing
New
Fossil
Fuels
Projects,
FORBES
(Nov.
15,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/emanuelabarbiroglio/2019/11/15/european-investment-bank-will-stopfinancing-new-fossil-fuels-projects/#42cedd5b9253.
117. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25; Montreal Protocol, supra note 25.
118. See also Stephen Castle, U.K. to Halt Subsidies for Fossil Fuel Projects Abroad, N.Y.
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/11/world/europe/UK-fossil-fuel-subsidies.html (last updated
Dec. 14, 2020) (highlighting that the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the
International Energy Agency have urged countries to reduce or cut government subsidies for fossil fuels).
119. Jeanna Smialek, Fed Joins Climate Network, to Applause from the Left, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
15,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/15/business/economy/fed-climatenetwork.html?action=click& module=Latest&pgtype=Homepage (noting that the Federal Reserve board
in Washington “voted unanimously to become a member of the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors
for Greening the Financial System” and that the Fed began participating in the group more than a year
ago, but “Republicans have eyed warily” the Fed’s formal membership while Democrats have been
fighting for it).
120. Stephen Leahy, Most countries aren't hitting 2030 climate goals, and everyone will pay the
price,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
(Nov.
5,
2019),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2019/11/nations-miss-paris-targets-climate-drivenweather-events-cost-billions/.
121. Id.
122. Amy Lieberman, Despite pandemic slowdown, climate change continues to worsen, DEVEX
(Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.devex.com/news/despite-pandemic-slowdown-climate-change-continuesto-worsen-98053.
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IV. CONCLUSION
As we move forward, the disruption to our long standing way of life will
fade away.123 The main challenge moving forward is to learn the lesson on
the importance of cooperation among countries, among scientists, and civil
society sectors. 124 The pandemic was a significant reminder that
international order exists to advance the protection of the human dignity.125
In addition, the role and necessity of governmental regulation was clearly
evidenced by the pandemic, because of different factors such as the necessity
of a national mandate on masks, the issuance of ban on international travels,
and coordination of resources to secure research and effective vaccination.126
[W]hen we get past this crisis—which we will—we will face a
choice. We can go back to the world as it was before or deal
decisively with those issues that make us all unnecessarily
vulnerable to crises . . . The recovery from the COVID-19 crisis
must lead to a different economy. Everything we do during and
after this crisis must be with a strong focus on building more equal,
inclusive and sustainable economies and societies that are more
resilient in the face of pandemics, climate change and the many
other global challenges we face.127

In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and its related economic
crisis, it remains to be seen if foreign leaders will use the disruption caused
by such crises to steer a greener economy.128 Let’s hope countries do their
homework and engage in specific policies effectively considering the social
123. See, e.g., Press Release, UN Secretary-General, ‘We are Only as Strong as the Weakest,’
Secretary-General Stresses, at Launch of Economic Report on COVID-19 Pandemic, U.N. Press Release
SG/SM/20029 (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sgsm20029.doc.htm [hereinafter
Economic Report on COVID-19].
124. Id.
125. Human Rights Dimensions of COVID-19 Response, Human Rts. Watch (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/19/human-rights-dimensions-covid-19-response; Patricia Park,
International Law for Energy and the Environment 26 (2013) (discussing the main goal of international
law, in general).
126. REGULATORY QUALITY AND COVID-19: THE USE OF REGULATORY MANAGEMENT TOOLS
IN A TIME OF CRISIS (2020), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=136_136858-iv4xb9i639&title=
Regulatory-quality-and-COVID-19-The-use-of-regulatory-management-tools-in-a-time-of-crisis;
RESPONSES TO COVID-19 IN THE UNITED STATES, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/covid-19responses/us.php (last updated Dec. 30, 2020).
127. Economic Report on COVID-19, supra note 123.
128. Megan Rowling, World leaders urged to learn from pandemic in adapting to climate
change, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/article/climate-change-coronavirus-politics/world-leadersurged-to-learn-from-pandemic-in-adapting-to-climate-change-idUSL8N2JX4Y6 (last updated Jan. 22,
2021).
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cost of carbon and the divestment from fossil fuels, while being more
attentive to climate justice.129 The Paris Agreement has instruments to steer
such policies.130 The open-ended question is if countries are fully committed
to such Agreement. Therefore, the next five years are of particular interest
for the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and more broadly, International
Energy Law.131

129. Janice Ng, The Social Cost of CalPERS’ Carbon Investments: $41.73 Billion in 2018,
FOSSIL FREE CAL. (July 16, 2020), https://fossilfreeca.org/2020/07/16/calpers-portfolio-contributes-tosocietys-costs-from-carbon-emissions/.
130. See generally Paris Agreement, supra note 12.
131. Paris Climate Agreement Q&A, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS,
https://www.c2es.org/content/paris-climate-agreement-qa/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2021).
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